Demand Response and Dynamic Pricing in the Smart Grid: Efficiency, Fairness and Robustness

P. Jacquot [1,2] O.Beaude [1] S. Gaubert [2] N.Oudjane [1]

[1]EDF Lab

[2]Inria and CMAP, École Polytechnique

June 29, 2017

EDF Lab, Paris-Saclay

Introduction: Demand Response



Introduction: Demand Response



Introduction: Demand Response



Introduction: Demand Response



Introduction: Demand Response



Model of Autonomous Network

- Optimization on a finite time lapse

Model of Autonomous Network

- Optimization on a finite time lapse
- Set of discrete time periods $\mathcal{T}$

Model of Autonomous Network

- Optimization on a finite time lapse
- Set of discrete time periods $\mathcal{T}$
  $\rightarrow$ for each time, production cost $C_t(\ell_t)$
  (increasing and convex function of total load).

Model of Autonomous Network

- Optimization on a finite time lapse
- Set of discrete time periods $\mathcal{T}$
  $\rightarrow$ for each time, production cost $C_t(\ell_t)$
  (increasing and convex function of total load).



- One distributor/aggregator d provides a set $\mathcal{N}$ of N residential consumers

Model of Autonomous Network

- Optimization on a finite time lapse
- Set of discrete time periods $\mathcal{T}$
  $\rightarrow$ for each time, production cost $C_t(\ell_t)$
  (increasing and convex function of total load).



- One distributor/aggregator d provides a set $\mathcal{N}$ of N residential consumers
- Consumers send their desired consumption profiles $(\ell_n^t)_t$,

- Optimization on a finite time lapse
- Set of discrete time periods $\mathcal{T}$
  $\rightarrow$ for each time, production cost $C_t(\ell_t)$
  (increasing and convex function of total load).



- One distributor/aggregator d provides a set $\mathcal{N}$ of N residential consumers
- Consumers send their desired consumption profiles $(\ell_n^t)_t$,
- Aggregator broadcast costs and aggregated load $(\ell^t)_t$,

Model of Autonomous Network

- Optimization on a finite time lapse
- Set of discrete time periods $\mathcal{T}$
  $\rightarrow$ for each time, production cost $C_t(\ell_t)$
  (increasing and convex function of total load).



- One distributor/aggregator d provides a set $\mathcal{N}$ of N residential consumers
- Consumers send their desired consumption profiles $(\ell_n^t)_t$,
- Aggregator broadcast costs and aggregated load $(\ell^t)_t$,
- Consumers eventually reach an equilibrium.

The essential ingredients

In the DR program, we should ask for:

The essential ingredients

In the DR program, we should ask for:

1. **Efficiency**: Resulting load profile should minimize global costs,

Electricity Consumption Game: the model

$$\sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \ell_n^t = E_n, \tag{1b}$$

(1c)

Electricity Consumption Game: the model

$$\sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \ell_n^t = E_n, \qquad (1b)$$

$$\underline{\ell}_n^t \leq \ell_n^t \leq \overline{\ell}_n^t, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \ . \qquad (1c)$$

Electricity Consumption Game: the model

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\ell}_n \in \mathbb{R}^T} \quad b_n(\boldsymbol{\ell}_n, \boldsymbol{\ell}_{-n}) \tag{1a}$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \ell_n^t = E_n, \tag{1b}$$

$$\underline{\ell}_n^t \leq \ell_n^t \leq \overline{\ell}_n^t, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \ . \tag{1c}$$

Electricity Consumption Game: the model

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\ell}_n \in \mathbb{R}^T} \quad b_n(\boldsymbol{\ell}_n, \boldsymbol{\ell}_{-n}) \tag{1a}$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \ell_n^t = E_n, \tag{1b}$$

$$\underline{\ell}_n^t \leq \ell_n^t \leq \overline{\ell}_n^t, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \,. \tag{1c}$$

where b_n is the dynamic price for user n (bill), taken as:

Electricity Consumption Game: the model

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\ell}_n \in \mathbb{R}^T} \quad b_n(\boldsymbol{\ell}_n, \boldsymbol{\ell}_{-n}) \tag{1a}$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \ell_n^t = E_n, \tag{1b}$$

$$\underline{\ell}_n^t \leq \ell_n^t \leq \overline{\ell}_n^t, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \,. \tag{1c}$$

where b_n is the dynamic price for user n (bill), taken as:

Definition (Daily Prop.)

$$b_n^{\mathrm{DP}}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \frac{E_n}{\sum_m E_m} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} C_t(\ell^t)$$

Electricity Consumption Game: the model

$$
\begin{aligned}
\min_{\boldsymbol{\ell}_n \in \mathbb{R}^T} \quad & b_n(\boldsymbol{\ell}_n, \boldsymbol{\ell}_{-n}) && \text{(1a)} \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \ell_n^t = E_n, && \text{(1b)} \\
& \underline{\ell}_n^t \leq \ell_n^t \leq \overline{\ell}_n^t, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \,. && \text{(1c)}
\end{aligned}
$$

where b_n is the dynamic price for user n (bill), taken as:

Definition (Daily Prop.)

$$b_n^{\mathrm{DP}}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \frac{E_n}{\sum_m E_m} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} C_t(\ell^t)$$

Definition (Hourly Prop.)

$$b_n^{\mathrm{HP}}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \frac{\ell_n^t}{\ell^t} C_t(\ell^t)$$

Electricity Consumption Game: the model

$$
\begin{aligned}
\min_{\boldsymbol{\ell}_n \in \mathbb{R}^T} \quad & b_n(\boldsymbol{\ell}_n, \boldsymbol{\ell}_{-n}) & \text{(1a)}\\
\text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{t\in\mathcal{T}} \ell_n^t = E_n, & \text{(1b)}\\
& \underline{\ell}_n^t \le \ell_n^t \le \overline{\ell}_n^t, \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \,. & \text{(1c)}
\end{aligned}
$$

where b_n is the dynamic price for user n (bill), taken as:

Definition (Daily Prop.)

$$b_n^{\mathrm{DP}}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \frac{E_n}{\sum_m E_m} \sum_{t\in\mathcal{T}} C_t(\ell^t)$$

Definition (Hourly Prop.)

$$b_n^{\mathrm{HP}}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_{t\in\mathcal{T}} \frac{\ell_n^t}{\ell^t} C_t(\ell^t)$$

$\rightarrow$ N-person minimization game $\mathcal{G} := \left(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}, (b_n)_n\right)$

Measuring Efficiency: the Price of Anarchy

NASH EQUILIBRIUM (NE)
$(\ell_n)_n$ is a NE *IFF* for all n:

$$\forall \ell'_n \in \mathcal{L}_n,\ \ b_n(\ell_n, \ell_{-n}) \leq b_n(\ell'_n, \ell_{-n})$$

Measuring Efficiency: the Price of Anarchy

Nash Equilibrium (NE)
$(\ell_n)_n$ is a NE *IFF* for all n:

$$\forall \ell'_n \in \mathcal{L}_n,\ \ b_n(\ell_n, \ell_{-n}) \leq b_n(\ell'_n, \ell_{-n})$$

Social Optimum (SO)
$(\ell^*_n)_n$ is a SO *IFF*:

$$(\ell^*_n)_n = \underset{\ell \in \mathcal{L}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_n b_n(\ell)$$

Measuring Efficiency: the Price of Anarchy

Nash Equilibrium (NE)

$(\ell_n)_n$ is a NE *IFF* for all n:

$$\forall \ell'_n \in \mathcal{L}_n,\ b_n(\ell_n, \ell_{-n}) \leq b_n(\ell'_n, \ell_{-n})$$

Social Optimum (SO)

$(\ell^*_n)_n$ is a SO *IFF*:

$$(\ell^*_n)_n = \operatorname*{argmin}_{\ell \in \mathcal{L}} \sum_n b_n(\ell)$$

Definition (Price of Anarchy)

$$\mathrm{PoA}(\mathcal{G}) := \frac{\sup_{\ell \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\mathrm{NE}}} \mathrm{SC}(\ell)}{\mathrm{SC}(\ell^*)},$$

where $\mathrm{SC}(.) = \sum_n b_n(.)$ is the *social cost*.

Bounding the PoA

- with *Daily* billing b_n^{DP}, every user minimizes $\frac{E_n}{E} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} C_t(\ell^t)$ (see Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010)

Bounding the PoA

- with *Daily* billing b_n^{DP}, every user minimizes $\frac{E_n}{E}\text{SC}(\ell)$ (see Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010)

Bounding the PoA

- with *Daily* billing b_n^{DP}, every user minimizes $\frac{E_n}{E}\mathrm{SC}(\ell)$ (see Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010)

$$\Rightarrow \mathrm{PoA} = 1$$

Bounding the PoA

- with *Daily* billing b_n^{DP}, every user minimizes $\frac{E_n}{E}\text{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell})$ (see Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010)

$$\Rightarrow \text{PoA} = 1$$

- with *Hourly* billing b_n^{HP}, the equilibrium is not optimal!

Bounding the PoA

- with *Daily* billing b_n^{DP}, every user minimizes $\frac{E_n}{E}\mathrm{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell})$ (see Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010)

$$\Rightarrow \mathrm{PoA} = 1$$

- with *Hourly* billing b_n^{HP}, the equilibrium is not optimal!

Theorem (J. et al., 2017)

Assume costs are quadratic:

$$C_t(\ell) = a_1^t \ell + a_2^t \ell^2 \ ,$$

Bounding the PoA

- with *Daily* billing b_n^{DP}, every user minimizes $\frac{E_n}{E}\mathrm{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell})$ (see Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010)

$$\Rightarrow \mathrm{PoA} = 1$$

- with *Hourly* billing b_n^{HP}, the equilibrium is not optimal!

Theorem (J. et al., 2017)

Assume costs are quadratic:

$$C_t(\ell) = a_1^t \ell + a_2^t \ell^2 \ ,$$

Then the PoA is upper bounded:

$$PoA \leq 1 + \frac{3}{4} \sup_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \frac{1}{1 + a_1^h / (a_2^h \overline{\ell}^h)} .$$

Bounding the PoA

- with *Daily* billing b_n^{DP}, every user minimizes $\frac{E_n}{E}\mathrm{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell})$ (see Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010)

$$\Rightarrow \mathrm{PoA} = 1$$

- with *Hourly* billing b_n^{HP}, the equilibrium is not optimal!

Theorem (J. et al., 2017)

Assume costs are quadratic:

$$C_t(\ell) = a_1^t \ell + a_2^t \ell^2 \ ,$$

Then the PoA is upper bounded:

$$PoA \leq 1 + \frac{3}{4} \sup_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \frac{1}{1 + a_1^h / (a_2^h \overline{\ell}^h)} .$$



The essential ingredients

In the DR program, we should ask for:

The essential ingredients

In the DR program, we should ask for:

1. **Efficiency**: Resulting load profile should minimize global costs,

The essential ingredients

In the DR program, we should ask for:

1. **Efficiency**: Resulting load profile should minimize global costs,
2. **Fairness**: Prices and bills sould be fair and attractive to users,

Fair's fair

Externality brought by n:

$$V_n := \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}} - \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}\setminus\{n\}}$$

Which would be equilibrium payments of the billing system:

$$b_n^{\mathrm{VCG}}(\mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{x}_{-n}) := \sum_{h\in\mathcal{H}} C_h\left(\sum_{m\in\mathcal{N}} \ell_m^h\right) - \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}\setminus\{n\}}$$

Fair's fair

Externality brought by n:

$$V_n := \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}} - \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}\setminus\{n\}}$$

Which would be equilibrium payments of the billing system:

$$b_n^{\mathrm{VCG}}(\mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{x}_{-n}) := \sum_{h\in\mathcal{H}} C_h\left(\sum_{m\in\mathcal{N}} \ell_m^h\right) - \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}\setminus\{n\}}$$

Definition (Baharlouei and Hashemi, 2014)

The fairness index of a billing mechanism $(b_n)_n$ is its maximal normalized distance to $(V_n)_n$ at a Nash Equilibrium:

$$F := \sup_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\mathrm{NE}}} \left[\sum_{n\in\mathcal{N}} \left|\frac{V_n}{\sum_{m\in\mathcal{N}} V_m} - \frac{b_n(\mathbf{x})}{\sum_{m\in\mathcal{N}} b_m(\mathbf{x})}\right|\right]. \tag{2}$$

Fair's fair

Externality brought by n:

$$V_n := \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}} - \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}\setminus\{n\}}$$

Which would be equilibrium payments of the billing system:

$$b_n^{\mathrm{VCG}}(\mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{x}_{-n}) := \sum_{h\in\mathcal{H}} C_h \left(\sum_{m\in\mathcal{N}} \ell_m^h \right) - \mathcal{C}^*_{\mathcal{N}\setminus\{n\}}$$

Definition (Baharlouei and Hashemi, 2014)

The fairness index of a billing mechanism $(b_n)_n$ is its maximal normalized distance to $(V_n)_n$ at a Nash Equilibrium:

$$F := \sup_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\mathrm{NE}}} \left[\sum_{n\in\mathcal{N}} \left| \frac{V_n}{\sum_{m\in\mathcal{N}} V_m} - \frac{b_n(\mathbf{x})}{\sum_{m\in\mathcal{N}} b_m(\mathbf{x})} \right| \right] . \qquad (2)$$

$\rightarrow$ Relation to Shapley Value

Cost of constraints

Definition (Daily Prop.)

$$b_n^{\mathrm{DP}}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \frac{E_n}{\sum_m E_m} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} C_t(\ell^t)$$

Definition (Hourly Prop.)

$$b_n^{\mathrm{HP}}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \frac{\ell_n^t}{\ell^t} C_t(\ell^t)$$



Efficiency Versus Fairness

Simulation: 30 days, 30 users EV owners *(Data Pecan Street Inc.)*



The essential ingredients

In the DR program, we should ask for:

1. **Efficiency**: Resulting load profile should minimize global costs,
2. **Fairness**: Prices and bills sould be fair and attractive to users,

The essential ingredients

In the DR program, we should ask for:

1. **Efficiency**: Resulting load profile should minimize global costs,
2. **Fairness**: Prices and bills sould be fair and attractive to users,
3. **Robustness**: Incentives should be sufficient to influence consumers.

User's preferences

Consumers might have a prefered consumption profile $(\hat{\ell}_n^t)_t$

$\rightarrow$ distance to this profile will be penalized.

User's preferences

Consumers might have a prefered consumption profile $(\hat{\ell}_n^t)_t$

$\rightarrow$ distance to this profile will be penalized.

Assume user's objective is modified as:

$$f_n^{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{\ell}_{\mathbf{n}}, \boldsymbol{\ell}_{-\mathbf{n}}) = (1-\alpha) b_n(\boldsymbol{\ell}) + \alpha \left\| \boldsymbol{\ell} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\ell}} \right\|_2^2$$

with $\alpha \in [0,1]$ the **preference factor**.

User's preferences

Consumers might have a prefered consumption profile $(\hat{\ell}_n^t)_t$

$\rightarrow$ distance to this profile will be penalized.

Assume user's objective is modified as:

$$f_n^{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{\ell}_{\mathbf{n}}, \boldsymbol{\ell}_{-\mathbf{n}}) = (1-\alpha) b_n(\boldsymbol{\ell}) + \alpha \left\| \boldsymbol{\ell} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\ell}} \right\|_2^2$$

with $\alpha \in [0,1]$ the **preference factor**.

What is the impact on the equilibrium profile and global system costs ?

Understanding a toy model

Assume: $\mathcal{T} = \{P, O\}$, N users,

Understanding a toy model

Assume: $\mathcal{T} = \{P, O\}$, N users, $C_t(\ell^t) = (\ell^t)^2$,

Understanding a toy model

Assume: $\mathcal{T} = \{P, O\}$, N users, $C_t(\ell^t) = (\ell^t)^2$, $\ell_n^t \geq 0$.

Understanding a toy model

Assume: $\mathcal{T} = \{P, O\}$, N users, $C_t(\ell^t) = (\ell^t)^2$, $\ell_n^t \geq 0$.

Proposition (Jacquot et al., 2017)

Assume $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}$, $\frac{\hat{\ell}_n^P}{E_n} + \frac{1}{2} \geq \frac{\hat{\ell}^P}{E}$ *, then, for* $\alpha \in (0,1]$*, the NE of* $\mathcal{G}_\alpha^{DP}$ *gives:*

$$\forall h \in \{P, O\},\ \ell^h = E/2 + \alpha \times (\hat{\ell}^{\bar{h}} - \hat{\ell}^{\bar{h}})/2 \ . \qquad (3)$$

Understanding a toy model

Assume: $\mathcal{T} = \{P, O\}$, N users, $C_t(\ell^t) = (\ell^t)^2$, $\ell_n^t \geq 0$.

Proposition (Jacquot et al., 2017)

Assume $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}$, $\frac{\hat{\ell}_n^P}{E_n} + \frac{1}{2} \geq \frac{\hat{\ell}^P}{E}$ *, then, for* $\alpha \in (0,1]$*, the NE of* $\mathcal{G}_\alpha^{DP}$ *gives:*

$$\forall h \in \{P, O\},\ \ell^h = E/2 + \alpha \times (\hat{\ell}^h - \hat{\ell}^{\bar{h}})/2\ . \tag{3}$$

Proposition (Jacquot et al., 2017)

Assume $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}$, $\hat{\ell}_n^P \geq \frac{(\hat{\ell}^P - \hat{\ell}^O) - E_n}{2(N-1)}$ *, then* $\forall \alpha \in [0,1]$*, the NE of* $\mathcal{G}_\alpha^{HP}$ *gives:*

$$\forall h \in \{P, O\},\ \ell^h = E/2 + \phi(\alpha) \times (\hat{\ell}^h - \hat{\ell}^{\bar{h}})/2\ . \tag{4}$$

where $\phi(\alpha) \stackrel{def}{=} \frac{2\alpha}{(1+\alpha)+(1-\alpha)N} \in [0,1]$.

Impact on the System Costs and the Price of Anarchy

System costs:

$$\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_t C_t(\ell^t),$$

Impact on the System Costs and the Price of Anarchy

System costs:

$$\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_t C_t(\ell^t),$$

$$\text{PoE} = \frac{\sup_{\boldsymbol{\ell} \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\text{NE}}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell})}{\mathcal{C}^*}.$$

Impact on the System Costs and the Price of Anarchy

System costs:

$$\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_t C_t(\ell^t),$$

$$\text{PoE} = \frac{\sup_{\boldsymbol{\ell} \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\text{NE}}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell})}{\mathcal{C}^*}.$$



Evolution of PoE-1 with α.

Impact on the System Costs and the Price of Anarchy

System costs:

$$\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_t C_t(\ell^t),$$

$$\text{PoE} = \frac{\sup_{\boldsymbol{\ell} \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\text{NE}}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell})}{\mathcal{C}^*} .$$

Social Cost:

$$\text{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_n f_n^{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{\ell})$$

Impact on the System Costs and the Price of Anarchy

System costs:

$$\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_t C_t(\ell^t),$$

$$\text{PoE} = \frac{\sup_{\boldsymbol{\ell} \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\text{NE}}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell})}{\mathcal{C}^*}.$$

Social Cost:

$$\text{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_n f_n^{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{\ell})$$

$$\text{PoA} = \frac{\sup_{\boldsymbol{\ell} \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\text{NE}}} \text{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell})}{\text{SC}^*}.$$

Impact on the System Costs and the Price of Anarchy

System costs:

$$\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_t C_t(\ell^t),$$

$$\text{PoE} = \frac{\sup_{\boldsymbol{\ell} \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\text{NE}}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\ell})}{\mathcal{C}^*}.$$

Social Cost:

$$\text{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell}) = \sum_n f_n^{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{\ell})$$

$$\text{PoA} = \frac{\sup_{\boldsymbol{\ell} \in \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{G}}^{\text{NE}}} \text{SC}(\boldsymbol{\ell})}{\text{SC}^*}.$$



Evolution of PoA-1 with α.

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

- Coordination Signal/ Energy Consumption Scheduler (ECS) or Dynamic Pricing

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

- Coordination Signal/ Energy Consumption Scheduler (ECS) or Dynamic Pricing
  - $\rightarrow$ which payoff for consumers ?

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

- Coordination Signal/ Energy Consumption Scheduler (ECS) or Dynamic Pricing
  - $\rightarrow$ which payoff for consumers ?
- Online / Offline version (Day-Ahead)

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

- Coordination Signal/ Energy Consumption Scheduler (ECS) or Dynamic Pricing
  - $\rightarrow$ which payoff for consumers ?
- Online / Offline version (Day-Ahead)
  - $\rightarrow$ Robustness against unplanned customers events (stochasticity) ,

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

- Coordination Signal/ Energy Consumption Scheduler (ECS) or Dynamic Pricing
  - $\rightarrow$ which payoff for consumers ?
- Online / Offline version (Day-Ahead)
  - $\rightarrow$ Robustness against unplanned customers events (stochasticity) ,
  - $\rightarrow$ Fast Convergence and Computation of the equilibrium

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

- Coordination Signal/ Energy Consumption Scheduler (ECS) or Dynamic Pricing
  - $\rightarrow$ which payoff for consumers ?
- Online / Offline version (Day-Ahead)
  - $\rightarrow$ Robustness against unplanned customers events (stochasticity) ,
  - $\rightarrow$ Fast Convergence and Computation of the equilibrium
- Large Scale Forecasting

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

- Coordination Signal/ Energy Consumption Scheduler (ECS) or Dynamic Pricing
  - $\rightarrow$ which payoff for consumers ?
- Online / Offline version (Day-Ahead)
  - $\rightarrow$ Robustness against unplanned customers events (stochasticity) ,
  - $\rightarrow$ Fast Convergence and Computation of the equilibrium
- Large Scale Forecasting
  - Non atomic (population) game model,

Conclusion and Perspectives

- Focus on three aspects of a Demand Response program

In practice, several issues:

- Coordination Signal/ Energy Consumption Scheduler (ECS) or Dynamic Pricing
  - $\rightarrow$ which payoff for consumers ?
- Online / Offline version (Day-Ahead)
  - $\rightarrow$ Robustness against unplanned customers events (stochasticity) ,
  - $\rightarrow$ Fast Convergence and Computation of the equilibrium
- Large Scale Forecasting
  - Non atomic (population) game model,

THANK YOU!

References

[1] Baharlouei, Z. and Hashemi, M. (2014). Efficiency-fairness trade-off in privacy-preserving autonomous demand side management. *IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid*, 5(2):799–808.

[2] J., P., Beaude, O., Gaubert, S., and Oudjane, N. (2017). Demand side management in the smart grid: an efficiency and fairness tradeoff (accepted). In *Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), 2017 IEEE PES*. IEEE.

[3] Jacquot, P., Beaude, O., Gaubert, S., and Oudjane, N. (2017). Demand response in the smart grid: the impact of consumers temporal preferences (submitted). In *Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2014 IEEE International Conference on*. IEEE.

[4] Mohsenian-Rad, A.-H., Wong, V. W., Jatskevich, J., Schober, R., and Leon-Garcia, A. (2010). Autonomous demand-side management based on game-theoretic energy consumption scheduling for the future smart grid. *IEEE transactions on Smart Grid*, 1:320–331.