Demand Response: Congestion in the Electricity Network

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Summer School on Network Theory CIGNE, Roscoff

Introduction: Demand Response



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

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

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

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

Model Autonomous Network

Set of time periods $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow$ per-unit price $c_t(\ell_t)$ increasing and convex function of $\ell^t = \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} \ell_n^t$ (total load).



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

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

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- Consumers converge to an equilibrium consumption profile.

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$\rightarrow \mathcal{G}_\alpha := (\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}, (f_n^\alpha)_n)$, Equilibria ? Yes!

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Proposition

Assume $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}$, $\frac{\hat{\ell}_n^P}{E_n} + \frac{1}{2} \geq \frac{\hat{\ell}^P}{E}$, *then, for* $\alpha \in (0,1]$, *the NE of* $\mathcal{G}_\alpha^{DP}$ *gives:*

$$\forall h \in \{P, O\},\ \ell^h = E/2 + \alpha \times (\hat{\ell}^{\bar{h}} - \hat{\ell}^{\bar{h}})/2\ . \tag{2}$$

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Assume $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}$, $\hat{\ell}_n^P \geq \frac{(\hat{\ell}^P - \hat{\ell}^O) - E_n}{2(N-1)}$ *, then* $\forall \alpha \in [0, 1]$*, the NE of* $\mathcal{G}_\alpha^{HP}$ *gives:*

$$\forall h \in \{P, O\}, \ \ell^h = E/2 + \phi(\alpha) \times (\hat{\ell}^h - \hat{\ell}^{\bar{h}})/2 \ . \quad (3)$$

where $\phi(\alpha) \overset{def}{=} \frac{2\alpha}{(1+\alpha)+(1-\alpha)N} \in [0, 1]$.

Efficiency: Price of Anarchy



Evolution of PoA-1 with α.

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THANK YOU!